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This paper focuses on the impact of China’s emergence on Brazil trade and 
investment flows and also on the policies and initiatives taken by the Brazilian public and 
private sectors seeking to meet the challenge raised by it. Based on this evidence 
alternative scenarios of future developments concerning China and its impact on Brazil 
will be outlined and Brazilian policies considered.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes the effects of 
China’s expanded role in the world economy on trade and investment flows from a 
Brazilian perspective. The recent boom in Brazilian exports to China, mainly of 
commodities such as soybeans and iron ore, but also of iron and steel products, is 
analyzed. Conditions of market access to the Chinese market are considered in the 
context of China’s accession to the WTO. Long-term perspectives for the expansion of 
per capita consumption in China of products which generate demand for commodities of 
Brazilian interest are also considered. Dislocation of Brazilian exports to third markets by 
Chinese competition since the 1990 is scrutinized. The structure of Brazilian imports 
from China is presented  and protection affecting such imports in Mercosur described. 
 
Section 2 examines the complementarity between trade and outward investment 
flows for Brazil and China. Diversion of foreign direct investment from Brazil to China is 
briefly considered. The third section focuses on Brazilian policies and China. This 
includes defensive actions by the Brazilian government to face Chinese imports – 
antidumping duties and safeguards – and offensive actions by Brazil in China involving 
bilateral governmental technical cooperation and joint stances in the World Trade 
Organization.  The conclusive section centers on future developments concerning the 
Chinese economy and how they may effect Brazil and considers policy suggestions to 
complement what has already been done to face the challenges and exploit opportunities 
raised by China’s increasing role in the world economy. 
 Two warnings are essential. The first is to stress that this is a paper on how Brazil 
reacted in the past, and should react in the future, to the emergence of China as a fast 
growing economy. It is not a paper on how successful Chinese policies can serve as 
stimuli for Brazil to follow the same path or how can Brazil devise alternative policies 
based on the Chinese example that would interrupt almost a quarter of century of near 
stagnation since 1980 with GDP per capita (PPP) increasing at the yearly rate of  0.4% in 
contrast with 8.3% in China.
2  The second warning is that inevitably, given the scarcity of 
systematic data on the subject, anecdotal information tends to occupy a more prominent 
place in this paper than prudence would have normally recommended. 
 
1.  Brazil-China: trade   
 
Bilateral trade between Brazil and China has increased significantly since 2000. 
After many years around 2% of total exports Brazilian exports to China exceeded 6% of 
total exports in 2003. Imports from China also increased in relative importance although 
less markedly: from about 2% of total imports in 2000 to about 4.5% in 2003. Seen from 
the Chinese angle the Brazilian export share of the Chinese market expanded from 0.48% 
of total exports in 2000 to 1.1% in 2003. The share of exports of Brazil in total Chinese 
exports remained constant around 0.5%  (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1  
Brazil and China: shares in trade flows, 2000-2003, %  
  Brazilian trade shares  Chinese trade shares 
 Exports  to 
China in total 
Exports 
Imports from 
China in total 
imports 
Exports to 
Brazil in total 
exports  
Imports from 
Brazil in total 
imports 
2000 1.97 2.19 0.49  0.48
2001 3.27 2.39 0.50  0.78
2002 4.18 3.29 0.48  0.85
2003 6.20 4.45 0.49  1.10
Sources: data from site of Brasil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio; 
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2002; People’s Daily, January 
12, 2004.  
 
                                                       
2 World Bank data. Even if criticisms of a persistent overestimation of China’s GDP are correct the contrast 
between  the growth performance of both economies remains striking. Exports to China   
 
Brazilian exports to China have been traditionally concentrated in a few 
commodities: soybeans, soybean oil, iron ore, iron ore pellets and wood pulp. The market 
share of this small group of commodities has hovered under two thirds of Brazilian total 
exports to China. Since 2000, Brazil, as many other economies, has significantly 
expanded its exports of iron and steel products in a booming Chinese market (see table 
1.2). The share of unprocessed products in total exports fell from 68.2% in 2000 to 50% 
in 2003 while those of semi-manufactured products rose from 13% to 23.8% and of 




Brazil: main exports as shares of total exports to China, 
2000-2003   
 2000 2001 2002 2003
Soybeans 31.1 28.3 32.7 29.0
Soybean oil    2.0 0.3 4.9 5.9
Iron ore  16.2 17.9 16.5 11.5
Iron ore pellets  8.8 7.5 7.2 5.4
Wood pulp  5.0 6.7 4.5 5.9
Iron and steel products   1.2 1.9 4.4 15.8
Other products  35.7 37.4 29.8 26.5
Source: data from site of Brasil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, 
Indústria e Comércio. 
 
The Brazilian market share of soybean imports into China has increased 
significantly since the early 1990s when it was under 10% of total Chinese imports of 
only US$ 48 million to reach more than a third of the market of about US$ 2.5 billion in 
2002. This was mostly at the expense of the US market share while Argentina, the other 
big supplier, continued to hold about 25% of the market. In 2003 national export data for 
Brazil and the US indicate that this trend has been reversed: Brazilian exports to China 
expanded by 59% in value in relation to 2002 while US exports increased 190%. Brazil’s 
market share was reduced to roughly 25% of the Chinese market of about 23 million tons in 2003. Imports of soy oil are less important and much more volatile than those of 
soybeans. Of total imports of US$ 369 million in 2002, Argentina supplied two thirds of 
the total and Brazil one third.  
 
The extraordinary increase in China’s soy oil consumption from 0.7 million tons 
in 1992-93 to 7 million in 2003-04 resulted from a 9-fold growth in the consumption per 
capita.. There is still ample scope for additional expansion of consumption compared to 
other Asian consumers of soy oil. China’s per capita consumption is only 40% of the 
South Korean level and  30% of the Taiwan, Province of China level. Imports of soy oil 
have traditionally been much more volatile than soybean imports. But imports of beans 
are likely to continue to expand at very high rates. China is reported to be planning to 
transform its Northeast region (provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning and the 
northern region of Inner Mongolia) into the world's largest producer of non-genetically 
modified high-yielding strains of soybeans over the next five years in a move to compete 
with foreign beans. But there are doubts about the availability of resources to finance 
such a project. 
   
The tariff on soybean oil at the date of WTO accession was 63.3% and has been 
reduced to 3%. Soybean oil exports to China are now subjected to a tariff-rate quota 
sunset provision under the conditions governing China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization. The in-quota tariff in the first year of the transitional period, 2002, was 9% 
for 2.5 million metric tons (out-quota of 48%). This is to be maintained until 2005 with 
quantities rising to 3.6 million tons with out-quota tariffs falling by 13 percentage points 
yearly to reach 9% in 2005 and thus turning the tariff-rate quota into a tariff.
4 The share 
of state-trading enterprises is to fall from 34% in 2002 to 10% in 2005. Other agricultural 
commodities of potential interest for Brazil are also affected by tariff-rate quotas: corn, 
sugar and cotton. In all cases trade liberalization commitments are much more modest 
than those for soya. For corn, whose tariff at the origin was 74%, the TRQ level is to 
                                                                                                                                                              
3 Puga et al (2004) used a constant market share model to find that between 1995 and 2002 actual export 
growth was somewhat lower than potential growth and that it was the increased competitiveness of 
Brazilian exports that compensate for the severe adverse effects of changes in export composition.   increase from 5.9 to 7.2 million tons in 2002-2004 and while the in-quota is held at 1%, 
the out-quota will fall only from 60% to 40%. The state trading share will fall only 
modestly from 68% to 60%. For sugar, the initial tariff was 71.6%, and the TRQ level 
will increase form 1.8 to 1.9 million tons, the in-quota reduced from 20% to 15% and the 
out-quota held at 50%. The share of state trading will be held at 70%.  In the case of 
cotton, the initial tariff was 61.6%, the TRQ level commitments will increase from 0.82 
to 0.89 million metric tons, the in-quota tariff will be held at 33% and the out-quota 
reduced from 54% to 40%.
5     
  
A small part of the recent increase in exports to China was due to price effects as 
commodity prices are recovering their levels of the mid-1990s. Taking the five most 
important commodity exports to China, price increases between 2002 and 2003  answer 
for slightly more than US$ 200 million, that is more than 21% of the absolute increase of  




Brazil: prices of commodity exports to China, 1996-2003, US$/ton 
  Soybeans  Soybean oil  Iron ore Iron ore 
pellets  
Wood pulp 
1996 287.4 535.2 16.7 32.4 363 
1997 297.6 522.7 16.9 32.6 366 
1998 234.5 602.9 17.2 32.2 309 
1999 179.4 392.7 15.4 27.7 397 
2000 189.1 340.9 15.1 27.6 550 
2001 168.4 274.8 14.7 29.3 299 
2002 199.3 413.3 14.8 28.0 336 
2003 215.1 494.2 15.9 29.7 357 
 
The expansion of Brazilian exports in China’s market has to a certain extent been 
a result of contraction in other Brazilian export markets. Table 1.4 shows that China has 
been importing an increasing share of Brazilian commodity exports. If the 2002 market 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Palm oil commitments are identical with the exception of the TRQ level which is due to increase from 2.4 
to 3.2 million tons. 
5 See Schedule CLII People’s Republic of China, Part I- Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff, Section I – 
Agricultural Products, Section I-B Tariff Quotas in World Trade Organization (2003) and Lohmar and 
Skully (2003). There are severe problems affecting the quota allocation process: in 2002 the fill-ins for corn 
and cotton were only 0.1% and 22% as reported in USTR (2003).  shares had been maintained constant in 2003 about US$ 97 million of Brazilian exports 
would not have been redirected to China, slightly more than 10% of the export expansion 
between 2002 and 2003.
7 Thus about one third of the expansion of Brazilian commodity 
exports to China in 2003 is explained by price increases and export redirection.  
 
Table 1.4 
Brazil: share of exports absorbed by China, 2000-2003 
  Soybeans  Soybean oil  Iron ore  Iron ore 
pellets  
Wood pulp 
2000  15.4  5.7  9.5 7.9 3.5 
2001  19.8  0.5  17.7 14.0 10.2 
2002  27.2  17.3  20.6 17.6 9.8 
2003  30.6  24.6  22.8 20.8 15.4 
 
  
Chinese imports of iron ore and pellets increased 18.9% yearly between 1992 and 
2003. Brazil has been steadily expanding its share of the Chinese market for iron ore. It 
rose from 19.1% in 1992 to 25.2% in 2002 in an import market of US$ 2.4 billion. 
Australia lost market share since 1992 but it still supplied 41.8% of Chinese iron ore 
imports in 2002. Brazilian market share for pellets also rose to about 50% of a total 
market of about US$ 0.4 billion in 2002.  The aggregate (ore and pellets) Brazilian 
market share increased marginally in 2003 to 27.7% in a total market of 148.1 million 
tons. Other major suppliers in 2003 were Australia (33.6%) and India (25.1%). 
 
China is already the largest iron ore market for Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
(CVRD) which is likely to increase further its market share in the Chinese market. Export 
revenues in 2004 will reflect a rise of more than 18% in iron ore prices. Worldwide iron 
ore price negotiations followed custom and started with a CVRD-Arcelor agreement of a 
18.6% rise in prices. This was followed by an agreement between CVRD and Shangai 
Baosteel on an increase of 18.27-18.64 % in the wake of the Australia-Japan deal 
following the Brazil-Europe deal. CVRD-Baosteel had signed a contract in 2001 for 6 
million tons/year, but a new ten-year contract followed suit in December 2003 to reach 
yearly sales of 14 million tons after 2010. After 2010 CVRD sales to Baosteel will total 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 Price effects between 2000 and 2003 answered for only 7% of increased Brazilian exports to China. 20 million tons/year. CVRD has been deepening its commercial links in China in many 
ways. It is reported as considering the purchase of harbor equipment from Zhenhua of 
Shangai and it maintains an office in Shanghai which provides services for Brazilian 
small and middle-sized companies interested in the Chinese market.   
 
The Brazilian share in the Chinese market for iron and steel products has been 
traditionally insignificant: in fact it fell from 1.64% in 1992 (HS class 72)  to 0.52% in 
2001. In 2002 there was a reversal of the trend as the market share increased to 1.09%. In 
2003 Chinese imports of such products increased by an amazing 61% in value but 
imports originating in Brazil increased by 439% to reach US$ 745 million.
8  Other     
traditionally less important suppliers of steel products – but larger than Brazil - also  
expanded their exports significantly: India by 319% to US$ 1.1 billion and Russia by 
111% to US$ 1.3 billion. 
9 
 
The unweighted average bound tariff on agricultural products in China is to be 
reduced from 31.5% before accession to the WTO to 17.4% in 2005. Average tariff on 
industrial products is to be reduced to 9.4%.
10 Data on 2001 MFN tariff and the bound 
final tariff in both cases weighted by China’s imports are presented in Table 1.5 below.  
Tariffs  affecting products of Brazilian interest other than agricultural products subject to 
TRQs is not substantial with the exception of all types of meat that are in the 10-25% 
range. Tariffs on certain types of iron and steel products exceed 15%. TRQs on industrial 
products are not relevant in the case of Brazil. Non-tariff barriers -- especially obstacles 
related to national treatment of foreign firms and the role of state trading  -- are of 






                                                                                                                                                              
7 But almost 20% of export expansion between 2000 and 2003.  
8 Brazilian export statistics. 
9 Chinese Customs Statistics, imports, www.tdctrade.com 
10 See Yang (2003), pp. 6-7. 
11 See Shafaeddin (2002), pp. 100-103.  
Table 1.5 
China: MFN 2001 and bound tariffs after transition following accession, 
main industrial products, % 
  MFN 2001  Bound rate 
Beverages and tobacco products  57.8  10.4 
Electronic equipment  10.6  2.3 
Wood products  10.0  3.4 
Paper products  9.3  3.3 
Motor vehicles and parts  31.3  14.1 
Textiles   20.5  9.4 
Machinery and equipment   13.4  6.6 
Ferrous metals   9.1  5.2 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products   14.1  8.1 
Metals nec  7.0  4.2 
Wearing apparel  23.8  14.9 
Transport equipment nec  5.0  3.6 
Metal products  9.7  7.4 
Manufactures nec  19.5  15.8 
All goods   13.7  5.7 
Source:  Shafaeddin (2002), Table 3.  
 
Brazil’s initial negotiating rights in the tariff negotiations leading to the accession 
of China to the World Trade Organization included soybean oil and its fractions (8-digit 
lines in HS 1507), palm oil and its fractions (lines in HS1511), rape, colza and mustard 
oil (lines in HS 1514), cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose (lines in HS 1701) 
and orange juice: frozen (HS 20091100). In the negotiations on tariff quotas Brazil’s 
initial negotiating rights included soybean oil, palm oil, rape seed oil and sugar. Brazil 
has not entered reservations under article 17 of WTO’s Protocol on the Accession of the 
People’s Republic of China.
12 
 
Sustainability of Chinese demand of commodities and new opportunities 
 
 
The recent boom in bilateral Brazil-China trade has underlined the importance of 
logistical problems as a barrier to trade expansion, especially so in trade surge situations 
and when bulk cargos are such an important element of trade flows. It has been reported 
                                                       
12 See WTO (2003). by spot exporters of iron ore pellets to China that freight rates have trebled in the recent 
months and are equal to the value of exports.  
  
With the exception of iron and steel products it is unlikely that present Brazilian 
exports to China will be affected by increased supply response in China as all of them are 
natural resources-based.
13 Chinese steel demand rose 21.7% in 2003 to 257 million tons 
while output lagged at 210 million tons. The surge in Brazilian steel exports to China 
which reached about 17% of total steel exports is a result of such a trend. But not only 
these exports are forecast to disappear in the near future but it is a well accepted fact in 
the steel industry that China will become a major steel exporter by 2010 and pose a major 
threat to present producers. Chinese steel output doubled from 100 to 200 million tons 
between 1998 and 2004, and additional capacity of 50 million tons will come on line in 
2005. The Chinese domestic market for steel is unlikely to be saturated until well into the 
2010s. If  the 1989-2002 rate of growth of steel consumption is maintained until the end 
of the decade China’s level of per capita steel consumption will reach 350 kg per capita 
per year compared to 450 in the European Union, 400 in NAFTA and 650 in Japan. A 
slightly more moderate rate of growth of consumption -- 7.5% yearly instead of 10.2% -- 
would rise consumption per capita to 300 kg. 
 
Among big present steel producers, Brazil is the only major supplier of iron ore to 
world markets and China’s steel industry is likely to continue to depend on high grade 
iron ore imports. Demand of imported iron ore and pellets in 2004 is estimated to 
increase by 35%.
14 Chinese steel producers are also planning to invest in Brazil as will be 
discussed below when considering Brazil, China and FDI flows. 
  
Other exports are thought to have a potential for growth. This includes traditional 
agricultural products as beef, poultry, pork meat and orange juice, and also transport 
equipment and software. Beef and poultry per capita consumption in China have   
increased at yearly rates approaching 5% in the 1985-2003 period while pork per capita  
                                                       
13 It should be note, however, that Brazil and other traditional suppliers of woodpulp as Canada and the US 
are being displaced by new suppliers such as Indonesia, Russia and Thailand. 
14 Estimate of the Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau. consumption expanded at 4% yearly. Fatter cuts of pork have been substituted by leaner 
cuts. But on the whole China has been able to supply its own needs of all these types of 
meats and the shares of imports in total consumption are negligible.
15 There have been 
claims that Brazilian meat exports were affected by sanitary barriers in the past.
16 These 
have been recently removed and a consortium of Brazilian meatpackers signed a first 
contract with the China Animal Husbandry Group and is hoping to supply US$ 100 
million in 2004. Expansion of orange juice exports depends on growth of a rather limited 
present market. Brazilian ethanol exports may be significantly affected by the expansion 
of Chinese imports even if in roundabout way. If Brazilian ethanol exports to the US 
enjoyed improved market access, US corn could be diverted to China instead of being 
used in a less efficient way to produce ethanol in the US.
17  
  
Dislocation of Brazilian exports by Chinese competition   
 
 
The contrast between the export performances of Brazil and China between 1990 
and 2003 is striking. For instance, China increased its market share in the US market 
from 3.1% to 10.1% while the Brazilian market share declined from 1.6% to 1.2%. Since 
1990 Brazilian exports have been dislocated in all world markets by Chinese exports. 
Moreira (2004) has shown that at the 5-digit SITC level Brazilian exports contracted 
between 1990 and 2001 by US$ 1,530 million – 4% of total exports in 2002 – due to the 
increased importance of China in world markets.
18 Losses were particularly heavy in East 
Asian markets (14.5% of 2002 total exports to these markets) and least important in the 
Latin America (2.6%).  See Figure 1.1 for such losses for four categories corresponding 
to  high (1HT), mid-range (2MT) and low (3LT) technological content as well as 
resource-based exports both in absolute terms and as a proportion of 2002 exports. 
  
                                                       
15 Data from United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Country pages, 
www.fsa.usda.gov  and Xiangjin and Jarratt (1998).  
16 See USTR (2003), pp. 46-7 for a reference to China’s declaration of zero tolerance for pathogens in 
imports of poultry and other types of meat. This was deemed to be scientifically unjustifiable by suppliers. 
17 Marcos Jank is thanked for this information. 
18 Brazilian export market shares in 1990 and 2001 are compared. Brazil loss of exports due to a reduction 
in market share is distributed among the shares of countries that gained market share in the relevant market.  
The estimate of loss due to Chinese products is the Brazilian export loss by product multiplied by the 
Chinese share of total gains for this product in the same period.     Loss in exports of low technology products was more significant in relative terms. 
Absolute export losses exceeding US$  20 million affected a wide range of products. 
High technology goods such as calculating machines, electric apparatuses for line 
telephony and parts for office machines and automatic data-processing machines. Mid-
range products: radio broadcast receivers for motor vehicles, ships (other vessels etc), 
ferro-silicon,  air conditioning equipment, insulated electrical wires, electric smoothing 
irons, excavating equipment, coils, and sewing machines. Products with low 
technological content included textile products undergarments and wire rods. Resource-
based products included inorganic chemicals and tin and tin alloys.
19   
 
Moreira (2004) also presents evidence on the similarity of export structures of 
China and Brazil. The coefficient of correlation for export composition for Brazil and 
China in the United States market has fallen from 0.5 in 1992 to 0.2 in 2001 (HS 6 digit 
aggregation) and has hovered around 0.1 for the rest of the world.  The results are similar 
for both all trade and manufactures. Direct competition between China and Brazil in third 
markets seems thus to be declining in importance.  
 
Imports from China  
  
Brazilian imports from China have been concentrated on a few products that do 
not include textiles, clothing or footwear (see table 1.6 for shares in total imports from 
China). The most important are coal and coke, organic chemicals, machinery and 
electrical machinery, equipment and parts. Coal and coke imports from China are 
displacing imports from Australia and are explained by the logistical opportunities 
created by return freights since much of the Brazilian export trade to China – and 
elsewhere in Asia – is of bulk commodities as iron ore, soybeans and steel products. Total 
                                                       
19 For the US market, using data at 6-digit in the Harmonized System for 1990-2003, estimates of the 
dislocation of Brazilian exports by Chinese exports an yearly basis show that it has peaked since 2001 in 
relation to all other years in 1990-2000 with the exception of 1997-98, just before the big Brazilian 
devaluation of 1999. Estimates of losses using this more disaggregated data set yields much higher 
estimates than using the 5-digit SITC.: an  absolute trade loss of US$ 1,801 millions in the US market 
compared to US$ 530 million in the 5-digit exercise.  
 weight of Brazilian exports to China in 2003 was 52.4 million tons contrasted with only 
4.8 million  tons of imports. 
 
Figure 1.1 
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Source: Moreira (2004). 
 
 
In all more significant products China’s imports are rapidly gaining market share 
in Brazil even while Brazilian imports shrink (table 1.7).
20 By far the more significant 
expansion has been in HS chapter 85, especially in headings concerning parts for 
consumer electronic products (radio and television), mainly displacing imports from the 
United States and Japan. Table 1.8 includes the relevant data. 
 
                                                       
20 Little is known about the importance of smuggled Chinese textile products in the Brazilian market. 
Evidence on other Latin American economies suggests that this may be very significant. See Arellano 




Share of specific imports (HS) in total Brazilian imports from China, 2001-2003 
 2001 2002 2003 
Coal and coke (2701 & 2704)  9.1 12.9  14.2 
Inorganic chemicals (28)  2.6 2.1 2.3 
Organic chemicals (29)  10.8 10.7 10.1 
Man made filaments and fibers (54 & 55)  0.8 2.1 4.3 
Apparel and clothing (61, 62 & 63)  4.8 2.9 2.2 
Footwear (64)  1.4 1.7 1.0 
Nuclear reactors, machinery and mechanisms (84)  13.7 10.6 10.0 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts (85)  28.6 29.3 33.0 
Optical, photographic etc (90)  5.0 6.0 6.2 
Toys, games etc (95)  3.5 2.3 1.5 




Brazil: shares of imports from China in total imports for selected 
Harmonized System chapters and headings (4 digits), 2001-2003 




Coal and coke (2701 & 2704)  950 17.3  25.3 32.0
Inorganic chemicals (28)  696 7.0  5.2 16.1
Organic chemicals (29)  3108 4.3  5.6 7.0
Man made filaments and fibers (54 & 55)  570 1.7  5.5 16.1
Apparel and clothing (61, 62 & 63)  117 40.5  34.9 35.8
Footwear (64)  54 59.2  54.0 31.6
Nuclear reactors, machinery and mechanisms (84)  7787 1.9  2.0 2.8
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts (85)  6771 3.9  6.5 10.5
Optical, photographic etc (90)  1812 3.1  5.1 7.4















Brazil: shares of imports from China in total imports, SH 3-digit and headings, 
2001-2003 
  Value of total  
imports 2003 
US$ million 
2001 2002  2003 
85 6771  3.9  6.5 10.5
 850   1342  3.0  3.1 7.5
 851  676  3.3  7.9 12.6
  8519 Microphones, loudspeakers  7  20.0  50.0 42.9
 852  1299  5.4  13.4 21.6
  8520 Magnetic tape recorders etc  6  0.0  0.0 0.0
  8521 Video recording or reproducing apparatus   15  3.7  10.0 40.0
  8522 Parts for 8519 to 8521  91  16.1  46.9 56.0
  8523 Prepared unrecorded media for sound recording  21  6.5  7.1 9.5
  8524 Records, tapes and other recorded   18  0.0  0.0 0.0
  8525 Transmission apparatus for radiotelephony  229  0.6  0.9 5.2
  8526 Radar and radio navigation apparatus  94  0.0  0.6 1.1
  8527 Reception apparatus for radiotelephony  76  23.8  34.3 42.1
  8528 Reception apparatus for television   13  7.7  8.0 15.3
  8529 Parts for 8525 to 8528  737  7.0  16.7 23.7
 853  1124  7.5  6.1 7.4
 854  2330  2.4  4.7 6.8
 
 
The available data on hourly compensation including fringe benefits for the textile and 
apparel industries in 2002 suggest that its level in Mexico exceeded that in China by 
factors of 3.33 and 2.78, respectively, in coastal areas and 5.61 and 3.6, respectively, in 
other areas.
21 No directly comparable data exist for Brazil, but other sources on hourly 
compensation costs in manufacturing as a whole, also for 2002, indicate an average level 
in Brazil 8% above such costs in Mexico.
22 It is not unreasonable to think of wages in 
Brazil at a level about three times those in (coastal) China. In consumer electronics 
productivity in Brazil is about 60% above levels in Mexico and China so that the sector in 
                                                       
21 USITC (2004), p. 3-7, quoting Werner International Management Consultants (2002) and Jassin-
O’Rourke Group (2002). a better position to face competition from Chinese imports but in other sectors a potential 
surge in imports from China cannot be dismissed as Brazilian labor productivity is much 
lower. The automotive sector is a good example as Brazilian labor productivity in only 
about 50% that of Mexico due to massive overinvestment after 1995 and high taxation.  
China can improve its very low labor productivity (one third of Mexico’s) very rapidly in 
a scenario where domestic prices are reduced and economies of scale adequately 
exploited.
23       
 
The level of protection faced by imports from China in the Brazilian (Mercosur) 
market is relatively high but with a low coefficient of variation. Most of the electronic 
parts and components are imported by producers installed in the Manaus free Trade Zone 
and are thus exempted not only of custom duties but also of all Federal state and 
municipal taxes (see Tables 1.9 and 1.10). 
24   
 
By the terms of China’s accession to the WTO it will be legal for other members 
to apply two specific safeguards. A transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism 
can be applied to Chinese products and it can be invoked if there is “market disruption or 
threat of market disruption rather than the more stringent injury test included in the 
agreement on safeguards which requires ‘serious injury or threat of serious injury”. It can 
also be used in case a safeguard applied by a given country diverts Chinese exports to a 
third country. The measure can be applied for 12 years after China’s accession. 
Safeguards, also based on rather loosely defined market disruption rather than on injury, 
can be applied to China’s textile and apparel exports until the end of 2008. In 
antidumping processes prices in third countries may be used as China is classified as a 




                                                                                                                                                              
22 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
23 See in McKinsey & Company (2003) the analyses of the auto and consumer electronics sectors. 
24 See WTO (2000), pp. 69-70. 
25 See Yang (2003), p.8 and Shafaeddin (2002), p.99. Some WTO members entered reservations concerning 
restrictive measures affecting Chinese imports into their markets. Conditions of phasing out vary. See WTO 
(2001).  2. Brazil-China: foreign direct investment 
  
FDI flows are often complementary to trade. FDI can be explained by import 
substitution as was often the case in Latin America where former suppliers abroad often  
Table 1.9 
Brazil: tariffs, standard deviations and coefficients of variation on main imports 
from China in total imports, HS 4-digit and headings 




Coal and coke (2701)  0 0  n.a.
Coke (2704)  0 0  n.a.
Inorganic chemicals (28)  7.0 3.9  0.56
Organic chemicals (29)  7.8 5.3  0.68
Man made filaments and fibers (54)  17.3 4.2  0.24
Man made filaments and fibers (55)  17.5 4.0  0.23
Apparel and clothing (61)  21.5 0  0
Apparel and clothing (62)  21.5 0  0
Apparel and clothing (63)  20.8 2.5  0.12
Footwear (64)  21.7 1.6  0.07
Nuclear reactors, machinery and mechanisms (84)  13.1 6.5  0.50
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts (85)  14.8 7.0  0.47
Optical, photographic etc (90)  12.6 7.4  0.59
Toys, games etc (95)  20.9 0.7  0.03




Brazil: tariffs on main electronic goods imports from China, HS 4-digit 




  8519 Microphones, loudspeakers  21.5 0  0
  8520 Magnetic tape recorders etc  18.8 7.6  0.40
  8521 Video recording or reproducing apparatus   10.8 11.8  1.09
  8522 Parts for 8519 to 8521  17.8 0.8  0.04
  8523 Prepared unrecorded media for sound recording  15.9 5.1  0.32
  8524 Records, tapes and other recorded   17.5 0  0
  8525 Transmission apparatus for radiotelephony  11.1 8.9  0.80
  8526 Radar and radio navigation apparatus  6.0 10.4  1.73
  8527 Reception apparatus for radiotelephony  20.4 4.3  0.21
  8528 Reception apparatus for television   19.9 3.1  0.16
  8529 Parts for 8525 to 8528  12.7 7.6  0.60
Source: FTAA Hemispheric Data Base. 
 
 joined efforts with importers to create domestic productive capacity. But FDI can also be 
export-oriented and related to the development of raw material supply as in the typical 
enclave mining economies. More recently, in a global economy, FDI in manufacture 
production may be partially or even fully export-oriented. Recent experience in Brazil 
and China  provides varied examples of different inducements to FDI.  
 
Complementarity between trade and outward investment flows: FDI by Brazil    
 
Total inward FDI stock in China at the end of 2002 was of US$ 447.9 billion.
26 . 
The stock of Brazilian foreign direct investment in China is very limited: in 2001 it was 
US$ 15 million, falling to 13 US$ million in 2003 (out of a total stock of Brazilian 
outward FDI of US$ 43.4 billion). There have been some additional export-related 
Brazilian investments in China in 2003 of which the most important was the Embraer-
Hafei factory in Harbin. Sabó, a manufacturer of automotive parts, and Marcopolo, a 
producer of  bodies for buses, both with a worldwide manufacturing presence have shown 
interest in investing in China. 
27  
  
A pioneer Brazilian-related investment in China was in the production of 
hermetically sealed compressors. Brasmotor S.A. started exporting to China in 1986 
when it maintained a partnership with the Whirlpool Corporation. In 1997, Whirlpool 
acquired a majority position in Brasmotor. Embraco Snowflake is a joint venture 
established in 1995 between Embraco and the Beijing Snowflake Electric Appliance 
group. It produces 1.7 million compressors yearly (about 12% of the Chinese market) and 
is expanding production to 3.7 million units. Embraco's headquarters and main factory 
are in Joinville, Santa Catarina, in the southern region of Brazil. There are other Embraco 
factories worldwide as well as a business office in the United States. It is interesting to 
note that Embraco has been repeatedly mentioned in the Brazilian press in recent months 
as an example of a Brazilian firm with a presence in China without any mention that it is 
controlled by US capital although with headquarters in Brazil. 
                                                       
26 UNCTAD (2003), Annex Table B.3.  
27 See in the site of Banco Central do Brasil the information on Capitais Brasileiros no Exterior for 2001 
and 2002.  
Other Brazilian subsidiaries of multinational companies are present in the Chinese 
market. Voith Siemens is since 1996 associated with Shangai Electric to produce turbines 
and generators for the Chinese market. Castings have been imported from Brazil. Voith 
Siemens has formed with GE Canada and Chinese Donfang a consortium to supply 
equipment to the Three Gorges power station. Two generators and two turbines are to be 
produced in Brazil at a cost of US$ 47 million.  
 
Perhaps the emblematic case showing the new possibilities for Brazilian 
investment in China has been that of Embraer, the successful Brazilian producer of 
commercial regional jets, which entered into a 51-49% joint venture with Harbin Aircraft 
Industry and Hafei Aviation Industry both controlled by China Aviation Industry 
Corporation II  to produce the Embraer RJ145 regional jet for 50 passengers in Harbin, 
Heilogjang province, in Northern China. The first plane produced by Embraer in China 
had its first test flight in December 2003. The total investment involved is of US$ 50 
million and the factory is planned for an output of 24 jets yearly. Harbin Embraer won a 
first contract  to supply 6 airplanes to China Southern Airlines. Embraer estimates a 
Chinese market for 650 commercial jets of less than 120 seats in the next 20 years.  There 
is competition from other entrants: state-owned China Aviation Industry AVIC I 
announced in December 2003 that it had received a total order of 35 jets for a planned 
regional jet, the ARJ-21, which will compete with the RJ 145 jets  produced in Harbin. 
 
Complementarity between trade and outward investment flows: FDI by China 
 
There are a few examples of FDI by Chinese firms in Brazil especially in the 
production telecommunications equipment and consumers electronic products (see Table 
2.1). Much more important are export-oriented FDI projects and prominently the 
proposed CVRD-Arcelor-Baosteel steel mill in Northern Brazil. Of the total stock of 
outward FDI by China at the end of 2002 of US$ 35.5 billion only around US$ 75 million 
were invested in Brazil.
28  
  
                                                       





Table 2.1   
China: stocks and flows of direct investment in Brazil, US$ million 
 Stocks  Flows 
 1995 2000 2001  2002 
Agriculture and livestock  0.4 0 n.a. n.a. 
Industry 0.6 22.4 n.a. n.a. 
   Scientific instruments  0.5 0 n.a. n.a. 
   Food and beverages  0 5.5 n.a. n.a. 
   Wood     0 14.9 n.a. n.a. 
   Machinery  0 1.8 n.a. n.a. 
   Electronic and telecomm. equipment   0 0.2 n.a. n.a. 
Services 26.9 15.3 n.a. n.a. 
   Vehicle commercialization  2.1 0 n.a. n.a. 
   Wholesale   15.1 10.1 n.a. n.a. 
   Retail trade  5.8 3.0 n.a. n.a. 
   Informatics-related services   0 0.2 n.a. n.a. 
   Services to industries  3.9 2.0 n.a. n.a. 
Total 27.9 37.7 28.1 9.7 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Investimentos Diretos, Distribuição por 
país de origem dos recursos.  
 
  
Huawei Technologies has won several contracts to supply telecommunications 
equipment in Brazil (access to fixed telephony networks and mobile commutation 
stations, optical data transmission solutions and added value services). Sales trebled in 
2003 to US$ 50 million and it is investing US$ 25 million in a new plant in Campinas. 
ZTE, another big Chinese producer of telecoms equipment, has invested US$ 3 million in 
Barueri, São Paulo, and is planning to invest a further US$ 10 million until 2006. China’s 
TCL Corporation, the largest world producer of TV sets, after its association with 
Thompson, is entering the Brazilian market in 2004 through a joint venture to produce 
TV sets, computer monitors and DVD players in the Free Zone of Manaus in Northern 
Brazil. SVA, another Chinese  producer of consumer electronics which started to export 
significantly to Brazil in 2003 also announced investment plans.  There are also reports of 
interest by Chinese firms to invest in other industrial sectors such as pharmaceuticals.  
  
The few present investments are to be dwarfed by planned future investments in 
the steel industry. Shangai Baosteel, China’s biggest steelmaker, Arcelor, the world’s 
biggest steelmaker, and CVRD, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, world’s largest iron ore 
producer, are going ahead with the feasibility study of a project for an integrated steel 
mill to produce 3.7 million tons of slabs yearly in its first stage and involving an 
investment of US$ 1.0-1.4 billion. The plant is to be located in Itaqui in the Northern 
state of Maranhão and will start producing in 2007 or 2008. This shall be China’s largest 
investment overseas. A second mill will be constructed, to produce cold-rolled steel 
depending on future demand. This will involve an additional investment of US$ 1 billion. 
CVRD, besides supplying the iron ore from Carajás, will have a share of around 20% in 
the new investment. Estimated yearly steel exports are in the US$ 750 million-US$ 1 
billion range. Part of the exports are apparently targeted to the US market where a fair 
number of domestic producers will have to close down capacity due the high cost 
required to overhaul their aged blast furnaces. CVRD and Arcelor are already partners in 
Companhia Siderúrgica de Tubarão-CST, a world leader in the production of slabs, which 
is expanding capacity from 4.64 million tons to 7.5 million yearly. 
 
Another joint venture between Chinese FDI and CVRD is being considered but 
has been facing opposition of environmental authorities in Northern Brazil. This would 
include an investment of US$ 1 billion by the China Aluminum Group and CVRD in a 
1.8 million ton alumina plant coupled with another joint venture to process alumina into 
aluminum in China. In the recent Brazilian presidential visit to China there were 
indications that Chinese FDI may be attracted by infrastructure projects in Brazil related 
to agricultural exports and energy.  But it remains to be seen whether this preliminary 
interest will be transformed into concrete investment. 
 
It is not simple to address any question related to FDI diversion affecting Brazil as 
the answer is bound to vary significantly depending on the choice of the period of 
reference. FDI inflows into Brazil were dramatically reduced in the 1980s as 
macroeconomic instability prevailed and only started to recover after 1992 with success 
of the  stabilization program. FDI then entered massively, reaching a peak of around US$ 30 billion (Brazilian statistics) in 2000. Most of this inflow was related to successive 
waves of a significant privatization effort which affected first industrial input producers 
(steel, petrochemicals) and then providers of public services (telecoms, electricity). 
Inflows of FDI in manufacturing remained rather low and only increased after the big 
devaluation in the beginning of 1999 (see tables 2.2 and 2.3). Table 2.4 shows the origin 




Brazil: FDI stocks. 1990-1995, US$ billion  
  Total    Manufacturing industry 
     Food  and 
beverages 









1990  37.2  25.7 1.8 5.1  3.0  3.1  3.6 
1991  38.6  26.2 1.8 5.1  3.1  3.2  3.4 
1992  40.0  25.6 2.0 5.2  2.9  3.2  3.3 
1993  47.0  27.3 2.0 5.3  2.9  3.2  4.9 
1994  56.5  29.0 2.1 5.5  3.1  3.4  5.3 
1995**  58.1  30.9 2.3 5.6  3.3  3.7  5.7 
*End of June. 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Investimento Estrangeiro Direto. 
 
 
Table 2.3  




   Total  Agriculture  Industry  Services 












1995  41.7                 
1996    7.7  0.1 1.7  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 0.3 5.8 
1997    15.3 0.5  2.0  0.3  0.4 0.2  0.3  0.2  12.8 
1998    23.3 0.1  2.8  0.1  0.4 0.2  0.4  1.1  20.4 
1999    27.6 0.4  7.0  1.2  1.3 0.1  0.8  1.8  20.1 
2000  103.0  29.9 0.6  5.1  1.0  1.1 0.6  0.8  1.0  24.2 
2001    21.0 1.5  7.0  0.6  1.5 0.3  1.5  1.6  12.5 
2002    18.8 0.6  7.6  1.9  1.6 0.4  0.9  1.8  10.6 
2003    12.9  1.5 4.5  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.5 1.0 6.9 
*End of year. 




Table 2.4  







   
    1996  1997 1998  1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 
Canada    2.0  0.1  0.1 0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4  1.0 0.1 
France  6.9  1.0  1.2 1.8  2.0 1.9 1.9  1.8 0.8 
Germany  5.1  0.2  0.2 0.4  0.5 0.4 1.1  0.6 0.5 
Italy  2.5  0  0.1 0.6  0.4 0.5 0.3  0.5 0.4 
Japan    2.5  0.2  0.3 0.3  0.3 0.4 0.8  0.5 1.4 
Netherlands  11.1  0.6  1.5 3.4  2.0 2.2 1.9  3.4 1.4 
Portugal  4.5  0.2  0.7 1.8  2.4 2.5 1.7  1.0 0.2 
Spain  12.3  0.6  0.5 5.1  5.7 9.6 2.7  0.6 0.7 
Switzerland    2.3  0.1  0.1 0.2  0.4 0.3 0.2  0.3 0.3 
United  States  24.5  2.0  4.4 4.7  8.1 5.4 4.5  2.6 2.4 
Uruguay  2.1  0.1  0.1 0.1  0 0.2 0.2  0.2 0.2 
Other  27.2  2.6  6.1 4.6  5.4 6.3 5.3  6.3 4.5 
Total  103.0  7.7  15.3 23.3  27.6 29.9 21.0  18.8 12.9 
  
 
To the extent that FDI in Brazil is mostly geared to the domestic or sub-regional 
markets it is unlikely that it will be significantly affected by investment diversion 
favoring China in the mid-term. Relatively small trade effects imply relatively small FDI 
effects.  The strongest candidate to diversion in the short-term is FDI in the automotive 
sector as the previous wave of FDI in Brazil in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to idle 
capacity exceeding 40% in 2003. It is no surprise that the present vintage of FDI in the 
sector is skipping Brazil as a destination. Beyond the mid-term, FDI in other sectors in 
Brazil may be vulnerable to diversion in favor of China. But indices of FDI source- or 
sector- coincidence of between China and Brazil are relatively small.
29 On the other hand, 
as already noted, the fast sustained expansion of the Chinese economy would attract FDI 
related to resource-based projects geared to supply raw materials and food to China. 
 
Brazil has been losing positions in the rank of FDI Confidence Index prepared by 
AT Kearney. It was second in 1998 (China 3
rd), fourth in 1999 (China 2
nd) and 2000 
                                                       
29 See OECD and United States Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis studies as quoted  
in the Task Force Report. (China 3
rd), third in 2001 (China 2
nd), fell to 13
th in 2002 amid increasing political 
uncertainty  (China 1
st), and recovered to ninth in September 2003 (China 1
st). In this 
latter date Brazil had been overtaken in the Kearney rank by four developing economies 
besides China: Mexico (3
rd), Poland (4
th), India (6
th) and Russia (8
th).
30  China’s major 
attractiveness advantages in relation to Brazil in 2003 concerned market size, 
financial/economic stability, production/labor costs, access to export markets, availability 
of M&A targets,   competitor presence, tax regime and political and social stability. Its 
disadvantages concerned transparency, quality of life and, by a small margin, 
infrastructure. 
 
The best possible defense against FDI diversion lies in deepening of sound 
macroeconomic policies to make possible a reduction in the costs of financing the public 
debt, a major additional effort to cut public expenditure, and in the adoption of  policies 
able to correct major market failures which unfavorably affect the competitiveness of 
Brazilian industry. These involve a wide spectrum of markets and issues that cover from 
long-term finance to the ability to enhance the adoption of innovative technologies. There 
has been an attempt to put in place selective industrial policies favoring four sectors 
(pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, software and capital goods) but specific instruments to 
be used in addition to those which already exist have not been detailed.
31 
 
It is somewhat surprising that contrasts between Brazil and China involving 
variables which would appear to be relevant to explain long term economic growth tend 
to be modest. This is clearly shown by the set of data amassed in the 2004 Knowledge 
Assessment Methodology undertaken by the World Bank. In a synthetic analysis Brazil 
dominates China in each of the four knowledge economy pillars: economic incentive and 
institutional regime, education, innovation, and information communications & 
technology. In a more detailed comparison, China’s performance is better than that of 
Brazil essentially in average years of schooling and investment in telecoms as well as in 
many innovation variables: gross FDI as a % of GDP, researchers in R&D, total R&D 
                                                       
30 See AT Kearney (2003), pp. 35 and ff.  
31 See Brasil (2003). expenditure as a % of GNP, university-company research collaboration, scientific and 
technical journal papers, royalty and license fees payments , science and engineering 
enrollment as a % of tertiary level students, researchers in R&D per capita, manufactured 
trade as a % of GDP. Most of the contrast in GDP growth performance of course is 
explained by the sharp contrast in gross investment as a share of  GDP (roughly 40% in 
China and 20% in Brazil) in the last couple of decades.
32 
 
3. Brazilian policies and China   
 
 
Defensive actions: facing China in the Brazilian market 
 
  
Since 1989 Brazil has become an important user of “contingency” measures such 
as antidumping and safeguard measures. This became particularly significant after Brazil 
abandoned its long standing discretionary system of important licensing under the 
balance of payments provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Article 
XVIII:B) which was traditionally applied with considerable laxity. But, as will be shown 
in the next paragraphs, the effect on imports from China was not important, with 
exception of antidumping measures on garlic and safeguard measures on toys. These 
products are already protected by Common External Tariff of Mercosur ad valorem rates 
of 14% and 20%. Potential imports from China without such measures are unlikely to 




If the number of definitive antidumping measures applied by Brazil is taken as an 
indication of discretionary protection China tops the list. Since Brazil started to apply 
such measures in 1988, of the total 101 definitive measures 20 were against China. The 
second most affected economy was the United States with 11 measures (see table 3.1 
below). In number of initiations of investigations China is the second most affected 
economy with 30, compared to 33 for the US. The number of definitive measures against 
                                                       
32 For detailed data and methodological notes see info.worldbank.org/etools/kam 2004. Chinese products peaked in 1998, when Brazilian producers were under pressure due to 
overvaluation of the Real, and have been recently rising again. 
 
Standard literature on antidumping measures focuses on the number of actions. 
But this is unsatisfactory as specific products affected may represent a reduced share of 
imports. Indeed, the first impression on the effects of Brazilian policies – that Chinese 
products are particularly targeted by discretionary protectionist measures if compared to 
imports from other origins – is put in perspective by closer analysis of the value of 
imports of products affected before and after AD measures are adopted (see table 3.2 
below). 
 
Import values affected before the adoption of measures are very small, even if 
compared to the modest total value of Brazilian imports from China of US$ 2.1 billions 
in 2003 (and, after 1994, below US$ 1 billion only in 1999). The only products listed in 
table 2.2 whose total imports into Brazil exceeded US$ 10 million in 2003 are garlic 
(US$ 43.2 million) and high-speed steel drills (US$ 12.6 million). It is true, however, that 
garlic total imports have been much more substantial in the past, reaching a peak of US$ 
113.5 million in 1997. Pencil total imports have exceeded US$10 million in 2001 but 
have dwindled since then. Otherwise Brazilian antidumping measures have only affected 




Safeguards have affected Brazilian imports of toys since 1996. They were initially 
equivalent to a 50 % addition to Mercosur’s Common External Tariff of 20%.
33 After 
1996 the surtax was adjusted so as not to exceed the bound tariff Uruguay Round tariff: 
to the CET of 20% were added surtaxes of 43%, 29% and 15% in 1997-1999.
34 In 1999 
these safeguards were extended for four years with additional import duties of 14% in 
2000 falling by 1% yearly to reach 11% in 2003.
35 This has been recently extended to 
                                                       
33  See World Trade Organization, Committee on Safeguards, S/SG/N/7/BRA/1, 12 July 1996. 
34 See World Trade Organization (2000), p. 47. 
35 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/8/BRA/2, S/SG/N/10/BRA/2, 2 
December 1999. cover the January 2004-June 2006 period with the surcharge falling from 10% in 2004 to 
9% in 2005 and 8% in the first semester of 2006. The sum of CET rates and safeguard 
surcharges will remain below Brazil’s binding of 35% for manufactured imports.
36 
Imports of toys had increased very rapidly in 1994-95 to reach US$ 139.6 million in 1995 
and China had a share of 54% of such imports. In 2002, when the CET plus safeguard 
was of 30%, total toy imports been reduced to US$ 33.4 million.  
 
Table 3.1 
Brazil: antidumping measures by origin of imports affected, 1988-2003  











 1988-1993  2  5 0 15  22
 1994  0  0 0 4  4
 1995  2  0 0 1  3
 1996  1  0 0 5  6
 1997  1  0 0 1  2
 1998  5  2 0 13  20
 1999  2  1 0 2  5
 2000  0  1 0 8  9
 2001  3  1 1 12  17
 2002  0  1 1 3  5
 2003  4  0 0 4  8
Investigations*   30   33 3 133  199
 1988-1993  3  12 0 35  50
 1994   3  2 0 6  11
 1995  0  0 0 5  5
 1996  2  3 0 12  17
 1997  4  2 0 9  15
 1998  3  4 0 15  22
 1999  0  2 1 15  18
 2000  2  1 0 7  10
 2001  4  2 1 11  18
 2002  4  2 0 10  16
 2003  5  3 1 8  17
* Including revisions and price agreements. At the end of 2003 there were three pending investigations on 
the revision of antidumping measures affecting  products originating in China: barium carbonate, high 
speed steel drills and permanent magnets. Other economies include European Union members until 1999. 
                                                       
36 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/8 /BRA/2/Suppl. 2, 





Offensive actions   
 
Brazilian offensive trade initiatives in China have been remarkably modest in the 
past. In 2002, after 14 years without any trade promotion initiative in the Chinese market, 
a high-level Brazilian trade mission visited China. At the same time a Brazilian trade fair 
promoted by the Brazil-China Chamber of Commerce took place in Shanghai. Brazilian 
ministers have visited China frequently since a new administration took office in Brazil. 
This effort was crowned by President Lula da Silva’s visit in May 2004, a move seen as a  
further step in the deepening of political and economic ties between the two countries that 
had started during the Cardoso administration. Many of the FDI projects reported above  
were commemorated and the government announced plans to further deepen economic 
and political links between Brazil and China. Bank of Brazil is to open a new office in 
Shangai. A new trade promotion office will be opened also in Shanghai. China is only the 
second country after the United States where Brazil will have more than one trade 
promotion office.  
 
Bilateral governmental technical cooperation   
 
Among many reports about enhanced cooperation between Brazil and China there 
were speculations in 2002 and 2003 of cooperation between China and Brazil on the 
definition of a common standard of digital television but there were few concrete steps to 
follow declarations of intention in the Brazilian side. Experts consider it likely that, if 
such a cooperation becomes a fact, it will result in the adoption by Brazil of the Chinese 
standard given the disparity between the respective markets for television sets (25 million 
sets/year in China compared to 5 million/year in Brazil).  
 
The most important channel of cooperation between Brazil and China is in space 
technology. By a protocol on cooperation signed in 1988 Brazil and China have agreed through the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) project to share costs (China 
70%, Brazil 30%) related to the development and construction of two satellites by the 
Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST) and Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas 
Espaciais (INPE). The first Sino-Brazilian satellite was successfully launched in October 
1999 and CBERS 2 in October 2003. Through a Protocol of Cooperation in Space 
Technology signed in September 2000 both countries agreed to develop a new generation 
of satellites CBERS 3 and CBERS 4 with costs and use equally shared. 
 
Table 3.2 
Brazil : Value of imports from China of products affected by antidumping 
measures,  1989-2003, in US$ million*   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1
Barium carbonate  0  0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bicycle chains   0 0 0.1 0.9 0.9 1.8 4.7 3.4 3.2
Bicycle  tires  0  0 0 0 0.1 0.8 1.9 3.2 2.2 1.9
Color and black 
pencils 
 




1.6 4.4 2.6 0.2
Garlic, fresh and 
refrigerated 
 




17.0 25.5 33.7 27.3
Glass inners for 
vacuum flasks 
 




0 0 0 0.3
Glyphosate 0  0 0 0 0 0.5  0.1  0 0.2 6.4




0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.6
Mushrooms 0  0 0 0 0 0  0  0.4 1.1 1.6
Padlocks  0  0 0 0.4 1.0 1.3 2.3 5.0 0.6 0.6
Permanent magnets, 









0 0.3 0.6 0.8
Table electric fans  0  0 0.2 0.4 1.0 4.0  6.5  1.2 0.4 0
Vacuum  flasks  0  0 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 0.2 1.8 1.9
* Years when antidumping measures started to be effective are marked in bold typeface. 
Sources: Brazil (1998) and Brazil (2002). 
 
 
The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in December 2002 
covering the development of a joint project on ethanol production and use and also other 
areas of cooperation deemed of strategic interest (iron ore, steel, agro industry, software, 








Brazilian diplomatic strategy after the beginning of 2003 has reserved a 
particularly important role to enhanced relations with China. Key policy-makers and 
President Lula have repeatedly stressed the advantages of a strategy based on closer ties 
with other big developing economies such as China, India, Russia and South Africa. In 
spite of such assertions, and the announcement of framework bilateral agreements 
negotiations with at least some of them, no negotiations of free trade areas with these new 
partners have been concluded. Unless there is a radical volte face by Beijing it is unlikely 
that China will sign a bilateral trade agreement with Brazil in the midst of the growing 
pains of its accession to the World Trade Organization. There are doubts also about the 
real interests  of  Brazilian industry in such a negotiation.
37 
 
In the World Trade Organization, Brazil and China have cooperated closely in the 
G-20 group of developing economies that put strong pressure on the European Union and 
the United States to improve their joint text on agricultural negotiations before the Doha 
Round ministerial meeting at Cancún. This was one of the issues that led to the failure of  
the meeting in October 2003. There is scope for Brazil and China reaching joint stances 
in the WTO as both countries tend to be defensive in relation to a long list of issues 
which form the demandeur agenda of developed economies: investment rules, intellectual 
property, public procurement, services, environmental and labor standards to  name just a 
few. But in relation to agriculture there is less common ground as China can hardly be 
included among the small worldwide group of agricultural efficient producers. In 
agriculture China’s objectives are to assure special and differential treatment of 
developing economies that will allow the postponement of a liberalization of access to its 
agricultural markets. There is a possible common agenda to justify a G-20 coalition of 
                                                       
37 It has been reported in the Brazilian press that the Brazilian Trade Minister under Cardoso was told so at 
the highest level  when he visited Beijin in late 2002. more advanced developing economies but much less so in agriculture than in relation to 
other issues. 
  
4. Conclusions  
 
Most observers suggest that China is likely to continue in the present growth path 
for another two decades based on the past experiences of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
as they tended to approach the level of U.S. GDP per capita.
38 This long-term trend is 
likely to prevail even if there are periods of temporary instability and slower growth.  
 
China’s fast growth will result in a fast rate of growth of Chinese imports of raw 
materials for which there is no possibility of expansion of domestic supply at a pace in 
line with the overall rate of growth and where consumption per capita levels continue to   
converge towards those found in mature developed economies. This includes iron ore and 
soybeans and, possibly, a significant number of other commodities for which there is no 
very significant demand presently such as prime beef or orange juice. Exports of iron and 
steel products to China are expected to decrease significantly in the mid-term as the 
massive present capacity expansion matures.   
 
China will continue to expand its exports much faster than the world average and 
to gain market share in third markets at the expense of less competitive economies. In the 
case of Brazil the two sectors most likely to be affected are iron and steel products in the 
mid-term perspective and transport equipment in the longer term. Increased market shares 
of both imports from China and products produced by Chinese FDI in Brazil are to be 
expected, especially in household electronic and telecommunications products. 
 
China will also act as a powerful magnet to attract FDI that would be diverted 
from other destinations including Brazil, especially so as investment opportunities in the 
provision of services open up but also in sectors until now relatively undeveloped in 
China as the automotive industry. Competition for FDI in the automotive sector is direct: 
                                                       
38 See data from Maddison (2001) on growth of such economies since 1950 as quoted by Wolf (2003).  multinational firms are likely to invest in China rather than in Brazil where there has been 
overcapacity for a considerable time. It is also likely that they would prefer to invest in 
China to be able to reap the advantages of scale that have proved to be elusive in Brazil. 
Most Brazilian investments in China are likely be in projects involving the exploitation of 
China’s factor endowments which are complementary to those of Brazil such as in coal 
extraction and coke production. Coal exports to Brazil also make sense from a logistical 
point of view since they would generate return freight in an extremely unbalanced 
bilateral trade from the viewpoint of bulk shipping.   
 
Bilateral cooperation priorities while taking into account the present strategic role 
of Brazil as a supplier of commodities to China could also involve programs to absorb 
Chinese expertise in enhancing its performance related to crucial innovation variables. 
International comparisons suggest China has been particularly successful in improving 
indicators related to education and research in hard science and engineering, increase in 
the number of researchers in R&D, and improvement in university-company research 
collaboration. This is a field where market failures are often found and state intervention 
may play a role in the dissemination of knowledge, in the reduction of private risk and in 
the removal of some of the difficulties involved in the private appropriation of economic 
gains derived from research results.  
 
Perhaps the most important objective to be kept in mind in the present Brazilian 
government effort to permanent redistribute resources in economic diplomacy, trade 
promotion and involvement of government-controlled banks in favor of deepening 
relations with China is that it should be sustained even in times of turbulence. Brazil had 
an almost insignificant role in China in the past and it is important that this should be 
corrected. The effort to seek closer relations with Beijin should sustained and not 
necessarily be dependent on broader coalitions of like-minded countries.  References 
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